Rawls argued that justice must be the foundation of our society and thus our legal system.
In contrast, legal practitioners almost never raise concerns about justice, at least not as understood in traditional societies. The notion of justice does not seem to be a central concern of our law schools. For instance, a law professor claimed that he never heard the word justice until his third year at Yale Law School.
That was simply a spontaneous response of "Is that justice?" to a news item reporting that a court had refused to indict Whites who had lynched a Black man (McConnell, Cochran, & Carmella, 2001) . Similarly, a lawyer reported that when a fellow student spoke about justice during his first days at the University of Oregon School of Law, the professor reprimanded the class, "Gentlemen, this is a law school, not a justice school" (Ralph Oyler, practicing attorney, personal communication) .
This separation of justice from law reflects a radical change that Jacques Ellul observed taking place when writing The Technological Society back in 1964. He believed that it was occurring because technicians were unable to fit justice into their systems. That, Ellul claimed, leaves our society directionless, "a compass without a needle" (p. 299). One consequence of this lack of direction has been the passing of more and more laws, creating a situation Phil Howard (1994) claimed is suffocating our society.
Scholars who share Ellul's (1964) concern, such as Henry Redner (2001 Redner ( , 2004 , Richard Stivers (1994) , and Duncan Forrester (1997) , speak of the losses that have resulted from the disappearance of justice. On the other hand, some legal scholars, such as Richard Susskind (2000) , see technology as the savior that will redeem an inefficient justice system. In either case, the conception of justice and law is no longer what it once was.
In this article, we explore how technology has helped erode society's conceptions of justice. We argue that this has been largely a result of the destruction of society's common story or vision and the introduction of the computer and the Internet as tools enabling technique to replace that story. We then offer a perspective on how justice operated in traditional societies, using the Judeo-Christian religious tradition as an example. Finally, we ask what might be done to recover the best features of what has been lost.
Technique and Justice
Scholars point to many causes for the current situation. Few, however, look at the role of technology. When asked how technology has affected their profession, lawyers typically respond with something about better police work and office devices. They point to strides in efficiency, such as DNA testing adding a new tool for accuracy in detection or fax machines enabling the faster communication of documents. Often, these observations are followed by a lament that new technology has created more work rather than leisure time, because their clients believe that these advances should enable faster service. The conversations often end with the statement that technology has destroyed much of the satisfaction previously enjoyed practicing the profession. Obviously, the speakers are defining technology as modern devices.
When one defines technology as technique, as Ellul (1964) did, its involvement is much more pervasive and fundamental. Ellul saw justice as the last bastion against technique, because it is by nature inefficient as it grapples with the messiness of reality. As technicians tackle this messiness, they not only use efficient machinery but also impose patterns that reduce all human activity to a series of methodic steps. Because traditional concepts of justice resist such reduction, their role must be diminished or eliminated. The result has been that the concept of efficiency has replaced justice as the foundation of our legal systems. George Grant (1986) observed that this has been part of technology becoming the ontology of the modern age.
With the current expansion of globalization, this change might be taking place even faster than Ellul (1964) envisaged when he spoke of technology endlessly extending itself. Justice is one of the values from local and traditional societies that have become obstacles that must be overcome if the free (world) market is to operate efficiently. This is very evident, as the Sharia, Islamic religious law, has become the focus of the present conflict between Islam and the Western world.
Justice in a Me-Cultured Society
The elimination of traditional concepts of justice has been part of the overall destruction of the common stories that formerly shaped communities. These stories were most commonly a vision of a just society and a norm for the present one. They reflected their context. Both the ontology of Plato and the teleology of Aristotle were directed at the needs of the Greek polis.
Justice was a concern for the morals and manners, ethics and customs, and traditions and taboos of a society. The laws of the justice system were enacted when there was a need for clarity in problem areas or conflict between differing interests. These laws remained somewhat general in that the burden for interpreting specific cases was given to wise representatives of the society, in the form of judges and magistrates. The underlying basis of all, however, was the common story that served as a norm for creating and evaluating the laws. The system worked because all members of the society lived with a common understanding of a good society, whether they totally accepted it or not.
As people increasingly responded to their perceived needs and felt desires with modern technology, they found a common story irrelevant. They dismissed it in favor of an all-embracing technology that promised to satisfy their goals more efficiently. Society was left with not one common story but rather many competing ones.
That pluralism presents individuals with a number of options for their conception of what a just society might involve. Beyond that, they are always free to change their minds. The acceptance of an option is always provisional. This is especially operative in a technological society in which all that seems to matter is individuals, who see themselves as free to make happen whatever they want. All that remains to handle individual preferences or coordinate various viewpoints is technique. Ellul (1964) described justice as increasingly becoming simply the administration of an orderly society that uses political planning to pursue its goals. The standard of justice disintegrates into what polls and elections report the populace feels they need or want. Ellul warned that this leaves it open to the manipulation of political experts.
In such a situation, the practice of law becomes "making a deal," usually an economic one. This is very explicit as more civil cases are handled out of court, not as resolution between persons in a community but as individuals relating to one another through law. It is also evident in criminal cases, as plea bargaining becomes a prevalent practice. Although this development might reduce court loads, it reduces justice to a means for efficiently settling disorders.
Justice is increasingly regarded as balancing the rights of victims and offenders rather than taking a stand on the breaking of trust with a community.
Courtrooms become the setting for adversarial conflicts that resemble sporting events in which the quality of justice has become too often the quality of one's lawyer. Common good becomes overlapping consensus, reality becomes abstraction, justice becomes administration, a just society becomes an orderly society, the limitation of power becomes the support of power, and community becomes mass society
The present practice of marriage is a good illustration. The rite is now regarded as establishing a conditional legal contract between individuals rather than an unconditional commitment that supports essential community values as well as care for one's partner. The Quaker practice of having the entire congregation, rather than just the pastor or judge, sign a marriage certificate expresses better the involvement of the entire community in the promises being made. Signing signifies not only witnessing the promises but also the community's pledge to support the union.
Law in the Computer Age
Technology has also contributed to the erosion of justice by providing the perfect tool for automating the practice of law. As technique has replaced the common story, the Internet and the computer have supplied the mechanical processing needed. The Internet makes possible the communication and organization of huge amounts of information. The computer provides a powerful means for handling these with binary processes. Technology has what it needs to proceed in its quest for efficiency without relating to the context of the community.
Increasingly, that quest regards the judge and jury as much obstacles as the common story. Fairness and impartiality seem to call for uniform and compulsory sentencing. Chance must be eliminated in the name of order. Arbitrary and fortuitous human nature must give way to certainty. The binary processes of the computer can replace the foibles of the judge and jury.
Although no one yet answers in the affirmative, many writers ask if computers should replace judges and juries. They seem to offer a way to remove completely ideology from the justice system.
In truth, the binary process has already replaced some of judges' function. In many areas, an offender who has been driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol simply works his or her way through a checklist that determines the automatic penalty.
The computer increasingly trumps judges' decisions. In the past, civil law judges often established fair monetary settlements and told participants to settle out of court. Now, insurance companies regularly reject such counsel, because their computer programs produce other figures. Most of the time, juries endorse the computers rather than the judges. Colossus, the software program developed by Computer Science Corporation to estimate bodily injury cases, is used by more than half of the nation's claims adjusters and by more than 300 insurance companies. Allstate is usually cited as the most rigorous insurance firm in rejecting any negotiations in favor of its findings. The name, Colossus, says it all (Frey, 2000) .
As the system takes away the discretionary powers of judges and juries, whatever discernment is left is placed in the hands of police officers. The least educated, unsupported by other members of the community, must decide whether the circumstances of a case warrant its being placed into the automated system or not. Fairness, as it is applied to a particular situation, is discerned now by the police.
Juridification
In some sense, the use of binary processes seems based on a third way of doing ethics, an ethic of responsibility, in contrast to ontology and teleology. Such an ethic responds to a given situation. However, in this case, the response is made without the benefit of context regarding shared norms or an understanding of the local community. From a traditional perspective, such abstraction is a response without responsibility. The result has been called juridification.
This new word, juridification, has been used to describe both the present practice of translating ethics into laws and the extension of laws to cover all areas of society. In juridification, technique rather than a concept of the just society drives the legal system. All the previous ways of regulating conduct become translated into laws that attempt to regulate every conceivable social situation. This has resulted in the enormous proliferation of laws in recent history.
The positive side of this development has been an apparently more efficient practice of some judicial goals, especially impartiality. The most common symbol for justice has been a blindfolded woman holding a set of balances. Justice is supposed to be blind if it is to be fair and impartial. Rawls (1971) acknowledged this by basing his quest for a definition of justice on negotiations made behind a "veil of ignorance." Now that there is supposedly a law for every situation, a Foltz, Foltz / TECHNOLOGY, RELIGION, AND JUSTICE 465 judge or jury has no need to engage in extensive deliberation that opens the system to an intrusion of ideology, opinion, and error.
Again, juridification enables a global society to find some of the uniformity necessary for transactions. When the common stories of cultures clash, one way to find a workable basis for relationships is to agree on the laws that should apply to specific situations. A case in point is the need for the European Union to blend European codes with English common law. From many systems of law, they create one.
These gains come at a cost, however. In attempting to be impartial, the system loses the human element. Persons become legal entities that relate to one another through the law rather than through face-to-face confrontations. A common legal order replaces other allegiances and loyalties. This is clearly seen at the scene of an automobile accident, where wise drivers remain silent, refusing to speak to one another as persons. Their insurance companies will determine "what is fair."
People no longer ask if an action is just but rather if it is legal. The problem with this was easily seen when the nightly news featured President Bush's 2006 State of the Union Address back to back with the start of the Enron trial. The president championed the republic as a nation of law that protected her people. The lawyers for the Enron officials claimed that their clients would go free because they had broken no laws. Obviously, those officials caused a great deal of harm and suffering, because they broke trust with our society, even if it is found that they did not break any specific laws. In one sense, the creativity that once was used to promote justice is now used to get around the laws. Howard (1994) warned that this state of affairs would lead to the criminalization of all. With so many laws, everyone believes that they must be breaking some. It is presumed that we all are forced to evaluate how much law can be broken justifiably. The result is the feeling that we all experience as we pass state troopers on the highway. Howard believed that this minimizes crime, almost making it acceptable, because everyone is doing it.
One questions whether this really achieves what we want. In the past, a multiplicity of laws would have meant inefficiency. One wonders if that is not still the case. The more proliferation of our laws, the more crowded our prisons. The more crowded our prisons, the greater the growth of a huge system providing services such as probation, counseling, monitoring, and security. This large system hardly supports the claims of efficiency that built it.
Efficiency and the Profession of Law
As this proliferation of law and binary processing becomes more prevalent, lawyers move from serving as advisers to being technicians. Susskind (1996 Susskind ( , 2000 , who speaks from the side of the law, believes that the Internet will inevitably greatly diminish their role as counselors. He sees lawyers by necessity becoming experts in handling information. We normally regard those who provide this function as technicians. Susskind (1996) sees this happening as the law become more and more accessible to the public through packaged expert systems available on the Internet as checklists. Strangely, Susskind sees this mechanical system working like the friendly conversations that take place when lawyers help one another. Supposedly, when a lawyer asks a friend for advice on a personal legal matter outside of his expertise, the friend offers a checklist of things to be done. Susskind said that this is quite different from the involved counseling a lawyer offers a client. To regard a checklist obtained over the Internet as more friendly than a face-to-face meeting with an adviser seems as strange as conducting an intimate sexual affair online. Something terribly important is absent in both situations. Susskind (1996) assured lawyers that they will still have jobs, if they adjust to the needs of the latent new electronic legal marketplace. He sees the future of law in proactive areas of risk management and planning. Lawyers will become compliance officers and planners. Somehow, Susskind sees this as relieving the crowding of our court system, because it will supposedly preempt court cases.
This moving from adviser to technician is a significant development. It parallels society's changing definition of a professional. In the past, professionals underwent long training and then professed certain commitments. Unlike technicians, who operated without ideology, professionals took positions. That was why the community could trust them. Now, society regards professionals as people who work for money, in contrast to amateurs, who do not. Technology is reducing professions to jobs.
Christianity and Justice
There is no way that we can to return to the common stories of past local and traditional societies. Instead, we are wise to ask what should replace them. That is hard to do, because we are no doubt in the midst of major changes, many of which are not clearly perceived. However, it is helpful to examine more carefully what we have lost in hope that we can retrieve in another form that which is helpful. In an effort to do this, we shall look at how the Torah operated in the ancient Hebrew community.
We have argued that the traditional concept of justice bound people together in community with mutual obligations and responsibilities to one another. Even a quick read of the social law in the Torah, the first five books of the Hebrew Bible, shows how this works. Although the Torah is usually designated "The Law," a quick read discerns that the text is more about teachings and guidelines than laws and regulations. In fact, the social laws are pretty confined to Exodus 20 to 23 and Deuteronomy 15 and 19 to 27. Significant for our argument, these are set in the narration of the people's common story. In fact, the law commands the telling of the story:
When your children ask you in time to come, "What is the meaning of the decrees and the statutes and the ordinances that the Lord our God has commanded you?" then you shall say to your children, "We were Pharaoh's slaves in Egypt, but the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand. The Lord displayed before our eyes great and awesome signs and wonders against Egypt, against Pharaoh and all his household. He brought us out from there in order to bring us in, to give us the land that he promised on oath to our ancestors. Then the Lord commanded us to observe all these statutes, to fear the Lord our God, for our lasting good, so as to keep us alive, as is now the case. If we diligently observe this entire commandment before the Lord our God, as he has commanded us, we will be in the right." This story appears over and again throughout the Torah. Alongside and sometimes merged with the social laws are also ritual prescriptions that provide annual and weekly feasts to retell the story. Clearly, justice flows from the common story of the people.
The social laws begin with the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments, which immediately makes clear that the concern is more about vision than concrete laws. Most of these guidelines, such as "Do not covet," "Honor your father and mother," and "You shall have no other gods before me" (Exodus 20, Deuteronomy 5) cannot be codified into specific enforceable laws.
This visionary function is evidenced again in the first laws in both lists. In Exodus, it is the command to free slaves every 7th year, because you once were slaves in Egypt (Exodus 21:1-11). In Deuteronomy, it is to forgive debts in the same year for the same reason (Deuteronomy 15:1-6). Such priorities would appear incredibly strange without their relevance to the common story.
It is obvious that the Torah's guidelines can be understood only when one understands their community context. All that happens involves the relationships of individuals not only to one another but also to the community. That is why the New Testament of the Christian Bible prefers to use the word righteousness rather than justice. The word clearly refers to relationships between people. To be righteous is to be in a proper relationship with God and people. Christianity is more concerned with proper relationships than with individual rights. In a Christian context, as in traditional societies, justice is primarily about how people relate appropriately to one another. Many theologians, especially Roman Catholics, use the word solidarity to express the concept in our time.
The Torah offers three kinds of justice, with only the first in much evidence in our contemporary technological society
Judicial Justice
Like all concepts of justice, the Torah calls for fairness and impartiality. This involves operating "eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe" (Exodus 21:23-25) rather than pursuing blood vengeance that can be all out of proportion. At least two witnesses are needed to convict (Deuteronomy 20:15). Merchants are not to carry two sets of balances (Deuteronomy 25:13). And although a Hebrew is to take special care to protect the weak, he or she is not to be "partial to a poor man in his suit" (Exodus 23:3).
Throughout the Torah, there is a concern to weigh motive and circumstance in an effort to be fair. For example, if an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox shall be killed, but the owner shall be cleared. However, if the ox has gored in the past and the owner warned, he or she shall be put to death with the ox. At the same time, the family of the victim can settle for a monetary redemption of his or her life .
In fact, money can also be substituted for blood vengeance or other penalty at many places, in an apparent effort to bring fairness to the particular situation. For instance, if a man seduces and has intercourse with a virgin who is not betrothed, he shall give the dowry and marry her. However, if the father Foltz, Foltz / TECHNOLOGY, RELIGION, AND JUSTICE 467 refuses to accept him, he must still pay the monetary equivalent of a virgin's dowry (Exodus 22:16, 17) .
Paul Ricoeur (2000) observed that these guidelines are quite different from modern attempts to give each individual his or her fair share. Here, the community is always involved. Ricoeur spoke of "mutual recognition" that acknowledges the role of all those involved as participants in a community that shares a vision of social cooperation (pp. 131-132) . A clear example of this is the command to release before battle those who have recently built a house, planted a vineyard, married a woman, or even are fearful and weak hearted (Deuteronomy 20:5-9).
Distributive Justice
This mutual recognition is also evident in the fact that almost all of the Torah law is social law with distributive dimensions. Justice is to serve one's neighbor, which includes not ignoring a cry from any member of the community. The distinguishing trait of the good society is obviously that "there shall be no poor among you" (Deuteronomy 15:4).
Because the Hebrew community always acknowledges the reality of sin, all law must primarily function to protect the weak and vulnerable. If God himself executes justice for the poor and weak, making sure that they have the necessities of life, we are to do his work as well .
By far the largest number of laws concern care for widows and orphans, as well as sojourners or foreigners . Farmers are to leave forgotten sheaves in their fields, to beat olive trees only once, and to take care not to pick their grapevines clean, so that the poor might glean (Deuteronomy 25:5). A Hebrew is to lend money to the poor when asked, without any base thoughts about the 7th year being near (Deuteronomy15:7). He or she is not to ask any interest (Deuteronomy 23:19) . Indeed, one is even to return garments given in pledge each evening, so that the poor are not cold (Exodus 22:25 ). An employer is to pay his or her laborers their wages on the day earned, for they depend on the money to feed their families (Deuteronomy 24:14, 15) . Men are to marry their brothers' widows, so that they have a means of support (Deuteronomy 25:5-10). This concern for the vulnerable is found over and over again, even feeling a need to warn against misleading blind people (Deuteronomy 27:18).
It is also extended to animals, as can be seen in the prescription that one should remove unusually heavy burdens even from the ass of one's enemy (Exodus 23:5) or that one should make sure the Sabbath is granted to one's livestock as well as one's household . Or again, one is not to muzzle one's ox while it is treading grain (Deuteronomy 25:4). Care even reaches out to the land, which a Hebrew is to leave fallow every 7th year (Exodus 23:10).
Because each is part of the community, goodsamaritan laws are natural. Therefore, if one finds one's neighbor's ox straying on one's property, one is to return it to its rightful owner. That includes returning the ox even of one's enemy (Exodus 23:4).
The predominant interest in care for the needy makes clear that justice in such a society is judged by how it treats the poor. Rawls (1971) tried to express this in his second principle, which defined fairness as the idea that any improvement for the wealthy must in some way also benefit the poor. In the Torah, however, this is the first principle.
Restorative Justice
An important question when dealing with community is when and how a condemned individual is given an opportunity to return as a full member. Those of the Torah's era seemed to have as difficult a time as modern society with this one. The death penalty is very prevalent, as it has been in most traditional societies. Until recently, there has been little need for prisons, because criminals were usually executed or else marked for life with brands as warnings that second offenses would bring death.
However, we can see a form of restorative justice emerging. Although premeditative murder is punishable by death (Exodus 21:12), unintentional killing is granted a partial restoration in cities of refugees (Deuteronomy 19). These have a fairly large role in the Torah, in which they serve in certain ways as parallels to modern prisons. The cities of refugees provide places for those who committed accidental deaths to reside in communities set apart. With no provisions for guards, they offered freedom within their boundaries. Their provision was an effort to provide a more merciful penalty in a society in which a demand for blood vengeance lingered.
However, when one considers that disease, especially leprosy, was considered a punishment from God, the rules about going to a priest for the certification of healing can be considered a form of restorative justice. A priest's judgment readmitted the diseased to full membership in the community (Deuteronomy 23:8, 9 This concern for restorative justice grew until the Christian New Testament made it a primary mark of the faith with Jesus's proclamation, You have heard that it was said, "An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." But I say to you, Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the right cheek, turn the other also; and if anyone wants to sue you and take your coat, give your cloak as well; and if anyone forces you to go one mile, go also the second mile. Give to everyone who begs from you, and do not refuse anyone who wants to borrow from you. You have heard that it was said, "You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy." But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and sends rain on the righteous and on the unrighteous. Scholars disagree if such restoration is really a function of justice. Ricoeur (2000) , for example, regarded this as moving to another plane, from justice to love. He compared justice to love as prose with poetry. However, if crime breaks community trust and capital punishment is not involved, some form of healing is needed.
Our present society is struggling with its necessity as it asks whether most criminals, especially those committing sexual crimes, can be rehabilitated. Frustrated with our failures, many advocate a "three strikes and you're out" approach for all crime. A number of workers in the prison system reject such ideas as irrational, citing evidence that as criminals age, they give up crime. Some of these counselors call for more effective rehabilitation work with criminals, especially accepting the long and grueling effort in dealing with their guilt (Forrester, 1997, pp. 75-76) .
Certainly, the most promising attempts at restorative justice in our time have been the truth and reconciliation commissions that have operated most noticeably in South Africa. This attempt to allow a society to go forward in spite of an era of extraordinary injustice is based on the belief that truth itself can heal. The concept certainly goes far beyond a juridification approach to law, because it returns to the vision of the good society embraced by a traditional concept of justice.
What Has Been Lost?
Langdon Winner (1986) wrote that when a technician hears a traditional story making claims for liberty, justice, or equality, such as that offered above, his or her response is always the same: "That's all well and good, but it is no way to run a railroad" (p. 36). Nevertheless, most people want living with others to be more than running a railroad. We acknowledge that we cannot return to the traditional societies we once knew. We know that there is no way a global society can operate like a local community. However, we yearn for the solidarity of face-to-face community. We would do well to examine what we have lost in the hope that we might retrieve that which is valuable in another form.
One of the major losses has been the ability to do ethics. In the past, we taught our children the common story, reinforced it regularly with ritual, and developed habits of the heart that enabled them to respond to specific situations with norms and vision. The understanding was that these habits produced a moral person who could respond to the needs of specific situations without always going through involved reasoning. Distributive and restorative justice was natural. The hope was that the moral character produced would prevail in unexpected and uncertain situations, such as the singular and those in which values collided. Ricoeur (2000) spoke of these as the tragic situations in which the heart must take a stand.
With the proliferation of laws, legalism has largely replaced ethics. We teach our children social skills that will be their means to success. They learn to obey laws primarily so that they as individuals do not get into trouble. Distributive and restorative justice is irrelevant. They too often confront the singular or the collision of values with "How do I get out of this?" or, more sadly, "How can I profit from this?" Perhaps even a greater loss has been that of wonder, even awe, regarding the role of justice in the community. A number of crimes no longer even involve the symbolic act of standing at the bar facing a distinguished representative of the society and expressing the understanding that crime is an offense against the community. We have lost the sense that a crime breaks trust with a community and with it the sense of responsibility for mutual cooperation with others.
It is this sense of wonder that leads people first to obey the community's laws and second to work for a better world. It not only arouses strong feelings but also inspires to determined actions. Traditional theories of justice inspired people not only to fight but also to die for the values of the good society. 
Conclusion
Our argument implies that the way to retrieve ethics and wonder is to seek a common story. In the fairly recent past, it could pretty much be assumed that even American high school dropouts had some knowledge of the stories of Shakespeare and the Bible. Beyond that, their lives in the community involved all sorts of common understandings of the just or good society. Today that has been lost.
Many are asking what that story might be in our time. At the recent International Association for Science, Technology & Society conference, WhaChul Son, of Sogang University, asked that question concerning his native Korea. He spoke of Koreans giving up their own story for the American story in the 1950s. He spoke of this story subsequently being replaced with a technology story, which has been discredited recently. He wondered what might be an adequate new story that would reflect the reality of the present situation but also provide the vision and norms that we have been describing as necessary.
We suggest that the way to seek this story is to make sure all parts of the community are involved in the public conversation. That conversation takes place primarily in response to current events. At present, it has been replaced by the contrived reporting by mass media that reduces all issues into arguments with only two inflexible sides.
If we are to return to an ethics of responsibility in our responses to events, we must broaden that conversation. Our response must be not only an efficient way to handle an immediate crisis but formed in a context of what we want our communities to be like. That includes our vision of the just society and the kinds of standards needed to achieve that.
Such an ethic often uses narrative in its quest for meaning and direction. It encourages all participants to tell their stories in an effort to reveal who they are. Stories are helpful too because their format is more often: "It is something like . . ." than "This is the way it is." Such storytelling can be done in a variety of venues, but certainly embodied and embedded face-toface gatherings must be included as we seek solidarity with one another.
Already, many parts of our communities have offered their contenders for the common story. Many politicians speak for the story of freedom. We are constantly told that America's mission is to take the story of freedom to other nations. However, freedom by itself is simply the celebration of a lack of story. It can produce emotional responses but not the kind of vision able to provide norms for a constructive ethic.
Physics offers the promised unified theory and biology the tested theory of evolution. However, understanding how things work does not help much in judging how people should relate to one another in building a better world. An abstract theory provides little social vision. From a religious perspective, both of these stories are gnostic, because they are based on attaining special knowledge. Such knowledge does not lead to action, because it does not provide a basis for developing a concept of the just society or a social ethic.
Of course, the dominant story today is wealth maximization, offered by economics. It replaces the natural law of traditional society with the supposedly spontaneous order of the market. It does offer a social vision but only by reducing all into economic terms. It proposes a form of ethics by using rational choice as a method and wealth as a goal, but only by the exclusion of many other important contributors to our communities.
We would argue that religion has a valuable story to offer. Many, including Ricoeur (2000) , question if it is even possible to have justice without religion. Others believe that religion has no place in a contemporary American conversation about justice or anything else. However, the separation of church and state does not include the exclusion of faith from the public discussion. To do that would not seem prudent when current conflicts on the national and international scene make clear faith issues play a prominent cultural role.
Regaining a sense of justice that can serve our society seems to require all voices in our communities to voice their visions of the just society and their perceptions of the norms necessary for attaining it. The first step in forming a new common story is certainly enabling all people to feel that their stories have been heard.
